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1. Introduction 
Facing poverty and prevailing underemployment, the question of job creation to 
ensure higher and more stable incomes is a fundamental issue in Peru. A basic problem is that 
the modern, or “formal” economy cannot absorb enough workers. As a result, the proportion 
of self-employed is striking: 56% of the households sampled by the ENNIV1 in 2000 have at 
least one self-employed household member2. Correspondingly, micro-enterprises make up 
96% of the country’s industry and employ 45% of the economically active population 
(Artieda and Wensjoe, 2002).  
The micro-enterprises in Peru show the characteristics typically associated with micro-
firms in developing countries: small scale of operation, low-income levels, stagnation, high 
mortality rates, and high informality. Furthermore, failure rates are found to be highest among 
the smallest and most informal firms.  
Formality is generally seen as a necessary factor for the growth of firms, since it 
allows access to institutions that ensure property rights, enforce contracts, or give access to 
capital. Indeed, the traditional literature views informality as one of the explanations for the   
failures of micro-firms in developing countries. Informality, in turn, is caused by government-
induced market distortions and regulatory inefficiencies. 
This paper, however, follows Levenson and Maloney (1998) who argue that 
informality per se is not the cause of the deficiencies of micro-enterprises. Instead, micro-
enterprises in developing countries are assumed to have dynamics similar to those in 
industrialised countries: entrepreneurs have differing unobserved abilities which determine 
the firm’s cost structure and thereby its long-run size and viability. Formality is recast as the 
firm’s decision about how much to participate in societal institutions, depending on the net 
discounted benefit to the firm. Most importantly, they argue that access to different 
institutions becomes more beneficial as a firm grows. Therefore, larger firms will be more 
willing to pay for participation, in the form of say taxes, than smaller firms will. As a result, 
firms transition from informality to formality as they grow to their long-run equilibrium size. 
The authors use cross-sectional data from Mexico to document the heterogeneity and depth of 
participation of micro-enterprises, and provide evidence of the importance of firm size, age 
and mode of production in explaining participation. 
                                                 
1 The ENNIV is the World Bank “Living Standards Measurement Survey” carried out in Peru.  
2 In comparison, the self-employed in industrialised countries typically account for 10 to 15% of the 
economically active population (ILO, 2002). 
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Building on this approach, the present paper aims to contribute to the understanding of 
firm dynamics and life cycle for modelling participation. Using unbalanced panel data on 
micro-enterprises from Peru, we find comparable patterns of participation, although the levels 
of participation are consistently lower than in Mexico. Secondly, we use balanced historical 
data to analyse the dynamics of the micro-enterprises. Young firms are found to show the 
lowest degrees of participation and the highest failure rates. Over time, growing firms become 
increasingly formal. Nevertheless, a considerable number of firms remain small and informal 
through time.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 highlights the main 
building blocks of the informality debate in order to place the approach by Levenson and 
Maloney (1998) in the context of the traditional informality literature. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical framework and the hypotheses to be tested. Section 4 reports and analyses the 
empirical results from  Peruvian micro-enterprises using both unbalanced and balanced panel 
data. Finally, section 5 concludes.  
2. The concept of the “Informal Sector” 
To use the words of an early critic, the concept of the “informal sector” is “an utterly 
fuzzy one” (Peattie, 1987, p.851). This has not changed since, regardless of numerous efforts 
to achieve greater conceptual and definitional clarity.  
The concept inherited many characteristics from the context it was born in. The 
dichotomy between “formal” and “informal” sectors can be seen as the latest in a line of 
dualistic conceptualisations stressing the contrast between two sets of economic activities, one 
relatively profitable and privileged, the other relatively disadvantaged. Following the tradition 
of economic accounting, the “informal sector” has been related to all activities that might bias 
the measurement of national income and the contribution of particular sectors3. Finally, the 
concept was born out of necessity during a series of studies on urban labour markets in Africa 
by the ILO. Keith Hart, to whom the term is attributed, found that the western concepts of 
unemployment and economic development were simply at odds with the empirical 
entrepreneurship in African cities (Hart, 1990).  
The original “informal sector” debate neglected the relationship between informality 
and illegality, and focussed on economic characteristics of both the firm and the market.  
Correspondingly, early definitions of the “informal sector” were based on ease of entry, 
unregulated markets, family ownership, small scale and labour intensive modes of operation 
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(ILO, 1972)4. According to Tokman (1992), the situation changed during the 1980s. Since 
then, regulations in general and legality in particular, have become key conceptual issues in 
the analysis and policy prescription for the informal economy. In fact, in a current attempt to 
clarify concepts and account for the heterogeneity of activities in the “informal sector”, the 
ILO has redefined informality as referring to “non-compliance by either enterprises or 
workers with all or some of the rules and regulations in the body of national or local 
legislation - commercial and/or labour legislation” (ILO, 2002, p.125). 
The concept of the “informal sector” has been applied to describe economic activities 
from the perspectives of both the worker and the firm. In either case, traditional approaches 
view government-induced market distortions, and regulatory inefficiencies as one of the main 
causes of the “informal sector”.  
One strand of the literature focuses on labour markets and the resulting lack of 
protection of workers. Mazumdar (1983) equates the informal economy with the low-wage, 
low-productivity segment of the labour market, induced by government regulations and trade 
union rigidities. For Rauch (1991), the dimension of the informal sector is related to a binding 
minimum wage regulation for firms above a certain size. An alternative view is that the labour 
market dualism arises endogenously from efficiency wage type considerations. Differences in 
the characteristics of production technology are argued to lead to differences in observability 
of effort, inducing larger firms to pay wages above market clearing (Esfahani/Salehi-Isfahani, 
1989). In these approaches, the “informal sector” is assumed to have a safety-net function, 
absorbing displaced workers in economic downturns, whilst they “queue” to enter formal 
sector employment.  
Other authors depart from the firm as the basic unit rather than the disadvantaged 
worker. This literature focuses on issues of tax evasion and regulatory compliance, based on 
the assumption that government enforcement agencies seek to maximise social benefit subject 
to a budget constraint5. Loayza (1997), for example, argues that the informal economy arises 
when the government imposes excessive taxes and regulations, combined with low quality of 
institutions and weak enforcement. This approach is in the spirit of De Soto (1989), who 
bases his analysis on the informal economy in Lima. 
In reality, there is a large degree of overlap between these approaches since most 
micro-enterprises constitute self-employment. In addition, empirical research provides 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 See Feige (1990), Thomas (1992).   
4 See Bromley (1978) for a discussion of the deficiencies of the original ILO informal sector concept.  
5 See Fenn and Veljanovski (1988) or Cowell (1990) for general models of regulatory enforcement.  
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evidence that the traditional view of dualistic labour markets with high earning differentials 
and workers queuing for jobs in the formal economy is only part of the story. Contrary to 
traditional assumptions, Sethuraman (1981) and Maloney (1998a, 1998b) find a significant 
overlap in income levels between the informal self-employed and formal salaried workers. 
Correspondingly, transitions and queuing occur in both directions. Actually, there are many 
cases of formal sector employees who choose to become informal sector entrepreneurs, and to 
remain largely outside of the formal regulatory structure. Sethuraman consequently redefines 
the informal sector as the small-scale end of an urban economic continuum. Furthermore, in 
contrast to Hart (ILO, 1972) and Tokman (1992), Maloney concludes that the informal sector 
overall behaves as an unregulated entrepreneurial sector, rather than the disadvantaged sector 
of a dualistic labour market.  
  With this overlap in mind, we in the next section define “formality” in terms of 
institutional participation, and discuss the relationship with the evolution of micro-enterprises 
à la Levenson and Maloney (1998). 
 
3. The theoretical framework  
The firm’s decision about how much to participate in societal institutions (such as 
national and local treasuries, governmental programs, banking system and trade 
organisations) depends on the discounted net benefits of participation.  
 The benefits of formality are numerous and include the protection of property rights, 
enforceable contracts and access to both capital and public risk pooling mechanisms. 
However, access to these institutions mainly benefits expanding or larger firms. For firms 
with a small scale of operation, the personal relationship between the entrepreneur and all 
involved parties might be sufficient to, for example, enforce implicit contracts or ensure 
property rights, while capital requirements might be covered by informal credit markets. The 
costs entailed by formality can be seen as taxes imposed by society in exchange for the 
benefits of access to civil institutions. These costs can be conceived as comprising an initial 
fixed cost f0 (including for example registration or initial information costs) and per period 
costs ft such as taxes or compliance costs. Following Levenson and Maloney (1998) we 
assume that a minimum degree of participation is a necessary condition for firm growth6 and 
can, therefore, be viewed as an input to production 
                                                 
6 This view also corresponds to De Soto (1989), who asserts that many aspects of “formality” are essential for 
the growth and efficient operation of firms, and that firms are willing to pay for these, but often denied access by 
oppressive bureaucracies.  
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),,( tttt zklqq =          (1) 
where qt is output, lt is labour, kt is capital, and zt is participation in a number of societal 
institutions.  All inputs are assumed to be complementary, and participation increases with the 
success of the business. Further, participation is assumed to be a voluntary decision7 based on 
the associated benefits, and free-riders are excluded.  
Levenson and Maloney embed this stylised concept of formality in the standard model 
of firm dynamics by Jovanovic (1982). In this model, firm heterogeneity is unrelated to any 
market distortions or structural characteristics found in developing countries, but instead 
derives from differing abilities of entrepreneurs, implying that firms face different cost 
structures. Efficient firms grow and survive, while inefficient firms decline and fail. The 
model thus gives rise to entry, growth and exit behaviour, and yields a distribution of firm 
sizes, because some firms discover they are more efficient than others.  
Firms are price takers and have complete information except for their true cost of 
production. Entrepreneurial ability, θ, is randomly distributed and affects a firm’s costs 
e
tt xqcC )(=  through a multiplier )( tetx εθξ +=  where c(qt) is a convex cost function; ξ(.) is 
a positive, strictly increasing and continuous function of θ, and εt are random firm specific 
shocks. Less able entrepreneurs will have large values of θ, larger etx and will therefore be less 
efficient at all levels of output. An entrepreneur makes the best guess of  xte, the expectation 
of xt conditional on information received prior to period t and chooses the level of output qt to 
maximise expected profits:  
])([max ettttq xqcqp −          (2) 
where pt is the price-taking firm’s output price. The output decision is taken before xt is 
observed, that is, )/()(' ettt xpqc =  where ∂qt/∂pt > 0, ∂qt/∂xet < 0. Each period, firms receive 
new information on their cost structure from the level of profits. Firms that realise profits 
above their expected level revise their estimate of xte downward since  
)()( ettt
e
tt xxqc −−=−ππ         (3) 
and increase their output decision thus expanding to their long run equilibrium size.  Note that 
firms will choose to participate if the discounted benefit net of  ft over the firm’s lifetime 
                                                 
7 The assumption that the firm’s participation decision is voluntary differs from the standard approach in the 
literature on tax evasion and regulatory compliance, which considers government enforcement to be the sole 
determinant of compliance and treats institutions as strict public goods, ignoring the potential private benefits of 
participation. See Cowell (1990) and Fenn and Veljanovski (1988). 
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exceeds the fixed cost f0. The learning process, therefore, has both static and dynamic 
implications for the differences in the degree of participation of firms.   
 Firstly, the properties of the cost function imply that a lower cost multiplier raises the 
profit maximising level of output. That is, at a given point in time, old firms differ in size 
because some discover that they are more efficient than others. Institutional participation 
among older firms thus reflects the underlying distribution of entrepreneurial ability θ.  
Secondly, since large firms are further away from the failure bound8, they have a 
higher survival probability and therefore a longer expected lifetime. This implies that large 
firms will choose to participate at an early age, while smaller firms will need more 
information about their viability, and therefore take the participation decision later. 
  Finally, the learning process broadly defines firm trajectories of growth and 
participation over time. Unexpectedly good information on profits leads to a downward 
revision of xt+1e and a rise in qt+1 above qt, which implies that the firm grows, while becoming 
more confident that it will survive. Both firm growth and higher expected lifetime have a 
positive impact on the choice of the degree of participation. A young but inefficient firm, for 
example, will stop growing at a relatively small size. Its expected discounted value of 
participation may not exceed the one-time cost of participation, f0, until it is assured of its 
long-run viability, if ever. In contrast to these “small survivors”, a firm realising large 
unexpected profits will revise downward its etx 1+  sharply, and choose output qt+1 at a much 
higher level than qt. These “large survivors” also start small but rapidly expand to a large 
long-run size, potentially deciding to participate at an early age.  
In sum, the model predicts that firms with viable cost structures transition from 
informality to formality as they grow. Small size of micro-enterprises, and lack of growth and 
societal participation may be due to differences in individual abilities and the noisy process of 
discovering them, instead of due to market distortions or regulatory inefficiencies. In 
particular, the framework predicts a positive relationship between firm size and participation. 
Larger firms not only have higher per period benefits, but also receive those benefits over a 
longer expected lifetime. Additionally, the model predicts a positive relationship between 
firm age and participation. Older firms are likely to have longer expected lifetimes because 
they obtain better information on their costs and are less likely to fail9. Therefore, among the 
                                                 
8 Jovanovic (1982) shows that there exists a common failure bound for all firms in an industry, defined as a 
minimum output level, below which no firm can profitably operate.  
 
9 Note that older firms are on average also larger. However, the positive relationship between firm age and 
participation might not be only due to the larger size. 
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younger firms only the largest might initially choose to participate, while the smaller ones 
may do so later.  
The testable implications of the model are: 
a. There is heterogeneity in the degree of participation by firms.   
b. There is a positive relationship between participation, firm size and years in business.  
In particular, young, small and inefficient firms are disproportionately informal10.This 
leads to the specification of the following model: 
tttot εageβsizeββ)tion(participa +++= 21Pr      (4) 
We approximate size by (log) real gross monthly revenue11, age is the number of years 
the firm has been in business, and ε is an idiosyncratic error term. We also include 
qualitative variables to control for time and sector of activity where appropriate. The 
probability of participation can be measured in different ways: (a) as an indicator 
variable for any participation in a given institution, or (b) as the degree of participation 
among several institutions. In all cases the null hypothesis is that 0and0 21 >> ββ . 
That is, participation should be a positive function of both firm size and firm age.  
c. If the mode of operation and formality are jointly determined, firm expansion 
involving greater capital stock requires larger permanent work sites, and at the same 
time more participation to establish property rights and legalise contracts. 
d. Firms participate in an increasing number of societal institutions as they grow. 
e. If the distribution of entrepreneurial ability and the learning process are similar across 
countries, then the underlying patterns of firm entry and exit in developed and 
developing countries should also be similar. The high mortality rates of “informal 
sector” firms might then not be evidence of their inferiority, but may instead reflect 
the high turnover among self-employed encountered also in industrialised countries.  
4. The data and empirical results 
4.1.  The data 
The data used to shed light on the nature of informality in Peru was extracted from the 
Peruvian Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) of 1994, 1997 and 2000 compiled 
                                                 
10 This implication is in line with many characterisations of the “informal sector” (see Thomas (1992) or Portes 
(1994) for overviews) in which informality is assumed to be the cause of inefficiency. Note that in our 
framework the opposite is assumed: inefficiency causes informality. 
11 Given that less than 4% of the sample have zero revenues, we drop them from the sample when using log real 
revenues. 
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by The World Bank and The Instituto Cuánto12. Although the geographic coverage of the 
surveys varies, they contain a subset of panel observations of households that have been 
interviewed in more than one year. 
The particular section of the LSMS used to conduct our tests, focuses on independent 
non-agricultural economic activities. In 2000, around 56% of the households interviewed 
declared at least one self-employed household member13. Information was then collected on 
the business that is most important for the household. The survey covers firm characteristics 
such as the type of activity, years in business, the number of paid and unpaid workers, the 
type of worksite, revenue, details on costs and capital stock14. We deflate revenues and costs 
using the CPI. The survey also provides information on compliance with or participation in 
certain institutions, such as registration with the national treasury, tax payments and indirect 
labour costs15.  
The sample has been restricted to firms with a maximum of ten workers16, which 
corresponds to the size limit used for the definition of micro-enterprises by the Peruvian law 
on small and medium enterprises17. The resulting sample sizes are 2471, 2422 and 2231 
household-run businesses in 2000, 1997 and 1994, respectively. 
 For the first part of the empirical analysis, we use all cross-sectional observations, 
identifying those firms included for several years. Subsequently, we constructed a balanced 
panel based on 606 households that were interviewed in 1994, 1997 and 2000. Of these 
households not all had a firm, nor did firms necessarily exist during all three years. 
Consequently, the panel contains 1031 observations on 648 firms, of which 399 firms are in 
the panel for only one year, 115 are in two years, and 134 are in all three years. In both 
panels, we use the codes for activities, goods and services to identify whether the firms of one 
household were the same in different years. 
 Recall that the survey only includes the most important business per household, and 
that we consider firms with ten or less workers. Consequently, a firm might “exit” the sample 
if it goes out of business, grows to more than ten workers, or if another of the household’s 
                                                 
12 In Peru, the LSMS survey has been conducted six times since 1985/6. The data from the first survey has been 
criticised for being non-representative because of its limited coverage, whilst the survey from 1990 was 
implemented at the height of the economic crisis.    
13 Of those households with self-employed members, roughly 25% had two self-employed, and 7% declared 
three self-employed household members.  
14 This section of the questionnaire has remained basically unchanged since 1994. Only the identification of 
unpaid workers was added as from 1997.  
15 Such as contributions to the public health and pension system (ESSALUD), the private pension system (AFP), 
or payroll taxes (FONAVI). 
16 These constitute 99.29% of the sample in 2000. 
17 See “Ley de Promoción y Formalización de la Micro y Pequeña Empresa” at  http://www.prompyme.gob.pe. 
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firms becomes the most important one. Correspondingly, a firm may “enter” the sample if it is 
newly founded or if it was created prior to previous interviews but was either not operating or 
not the most important firm for the household at the time of previous interviews.  
Finally, note that some firms have stated different years of creation, possibly because 
of the informal and sporadic nature of their activities. After identifying the firm, we assumed 
that the year of creation reported the first time is the “true” year of creation and 
correspondingly yields the “true” age of the firm. 
4.2. Patterns of participation  
Table 1 shows the summary statistics for all sectors and per sector of activity. On 
average, firms have been in business for almost 9 years. Although the sample contains firms 
with up to ten workers, they have on average one paid and one unpaid worker. Within the 
period under study, 41% of the sampled firms have paid workers whereas 86% have unpaid 
workers. This highlights the fact that we are mainly dealing with self-employment and family-
run enterprises. Of the entire sample, 37% of firms have their worksite within the household, 
13% operate in other fixed premises and 40% are mobile. Only 22% of firms are registered 
with the national treasury, and only 28% pay any taxes18. Of those firms that have paid 
workers, only 4% pay some indirect labour costs, i.e. social security contributions and/or 
payroll tax.  
Separating firms in the production, resale and service sectors shows that there are 
indeed sector-specific differences. On average, firms in the production sector tend to be older, 
have the highest number of paid workers, and operate more from the household than their 
counterparts. Firms in the resale sector tend to have the highest number of unpaid workers, 
and are more likely to operate from fixed premises outside the household, be registered with 
the national treasury, and pay council or other taxes19. In contrast, firms in the service sector 
are more likely to be mobile businesses and pay indirect labour costs. Consequently, although 
the following analysis is performed using the aggregate data, we will disaggregate at the 
sector level where appropriate.  
a. Heterogeneity of Participation 
Table 2 presents cross tabulations between participation in different institutions, and 
illustrates that formality among Peruvian micro-enterprises is indeed very heterogeneous.  
                                                 
18 The taxes identified in the survey are council tax and other taxes. 
19 The observation that the most visible firms such as retailers are more likely to pay taxes than less visible ones, 
corresponds to both De Soto (1989) and predictions of the literature on regulatory and tax enforcement (Cowell, 
1990).   
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A striking example illustrating that participation in one institution need not imply 
participation in others is given in the first row of table 2. Among all firms in the sample, 22% 
are registered with the national treasury and 28% pay some taxes. Note that this does not 
imply that all registered firms pay taxes or that non-registered firms do not pay taxes. In fact, 
only 71% of registered firms pay (any) taxes, whereas 14% of non-registered firms do20. 
Furthermore, of all firms that have both paid workers and have been in business for more than 
three years, only 33% are registered, 37% pay taxes, and 4% pay indirect labour costs. This 
clearly shows that informality covers many dimensions and that possible complementarities 
between different institutions may need to be considered when modelling regulatory and tax 
compliance. 
b. Participation in institutions  
At first glance, the data in table 3 displays a strong positive relationship between firm 
size and the degree of participation in individual institutions. The relationship between 
participation and firm age is also positive, although less strong.  
Table 4 reports the results from fitting probit regressions for the different types of 
institutions, and the estimated marginal effects evaluated at the mean. The qualitative 
dependent variable takes the value of one if participation is positive and zero if there is no 
participation. For the estimates pertaining to registration with the national treasury and tax 
compliance, the coefficients on both firm size and age have the expected positive signs and 
are statistically significant at conventional levels.   
  The impact of size on participation is found to be much stronger than the impact of 
age.  The effect of an increase in log revenue by one unit increases the rate of registration and 
the rate of tax compliance in similar magnitudes (around 14%).  In contrast, an additional year 
in business increases registration or tax compliance by only 0.01%. In terms of indirect labour 
costs, firm age is not significant but the coefficient on firm’s revenue is significantly positive 
although lower than for other institutions. An increase in log revenue by one unit leads to an 
increase in the probability of complying with indirect labour costs of only 2%. 
When disaggregating by sectors (production, resale and services), the results regarding 
the impact of firm size on participation are similar. Years in business, however, only explain 
registration in the resale and service sector and tax compliance in the resale sector. Comparing 
the impact of changes in the regressors on the probability of participation, there are no large 
variations between sectors. 
                                                 
20 About half of these firms pay council taxes and half pay other taxes, while hardly any firms in this group pay 
both. 
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We use a similar procedure to test for depth of participation, measured by the fraction 
of institutions a firm participates in. The fraction of institutions encompasses whether a firm 
is registered with the national treasury, pays council tax, any other tax, or indirect labour 
costs. For all firms and by sector of activity, the results reported in table 5 show that the 
estimated coefficients of firm size and age are both positive and statistically significant. 
Overall, the data supports the prediction that as the firm grows and becomes older, the 
firm is not only more likely to participate in a given institution but it is also more likely to 
participate in a larger number of different institutions. 
c. Mode of Operation 
Permanent worksite is a dummy variable taking the value one for firms that operate 
from a fixed site (excluding the household) and zero otherwise. If mode of operation is jointly 
determined with the degree of participation, then it is possible to regress equation (4) using 
permanent worksite instead of participation as the dependent variable. As expected, table 6 
shows that firm size and age are positively and significantly related to the permanence of 
worksite. Although the controls for sector of activity are not statistically significant, 
regressions per sector show that real revenue has the expected signs, while age is only 
significantly positive in the resale sector21. Overall, these results indicate that the mode of 
operation, like participation, is influenced by a firm’s dynamics.  
 
4.3. Firm dynamics and participation  
Next, we use balanced longitudinal data to re-examine the dynamic predictions of the 
model. Although the number of firms in the balanced panel is small, the results support the 
hypothesis of the importance of firm life-cycle considerations for the analysis of participation   
a. Entry and exit rates 
Table 7 shows that the number of firms in the sample in each year, as well as the 
proportions of firms entering, exiting, or remaining in operation are surprisingly constant over 
time22. The proportion of firms that have remained in business since the previous survey 
(survivors) is only around 55%. In addition, over 40% of those firms which are in the survey 
one year have left by the next. The turnover of the micro-enterprises in the survey samples is 
                                                 
21   These are not reported but available from the authors upon request. 
22 Given that 1994 is our initial survey, we cannot distinguish whether firms older than two years have been in 
business continuously or if they are re-entries. Note that there is a large degree of overlap between the firms in 
the different groups. For example, observations of a firm that enters in 1994, remains in business in 1997 but 
exits by 2000, will be in all three groups.  
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thus very high. Note however, that the construction of the panel leads to an overestimation of 
entry and exit rates compared to reality.   
  Although the entry rates to the sample are as high as 46%, only around 20% of the 
firms sampled in one period really are newly founded businesses. Another 22-27% of the 
sample corresponds to firms entering the sample for the first time, despite having existed for a 
longer time. These “re-entries” are firms that have not been in constant operation or were not 
reported as most important for the household in the previous surveys.  
The data also shows different survival rates for the different groups of firms. Of the 
new entries in 1997, 63% have exited by 2000, as have 53% of the re-entries, and 28% of the 
survivors of 1997.  This indicates that the failure rates are highest among new entries, which 
is consistent with the predictions of the Jovanovic model (1982).  
b. Characteristics of entering, re-entering, exiting and surviving firms 
These groups have quite distinct characteristics with regard not only to their survival 
rates, but also their average size and age, mode of operation and participation in societal 
institutions (table 8). As shown below, these differences are found to be consistent with our 
predictions on firm dynamics and participation. 
The group of survivors has the highest average level of net real revenue. The mode of 
operation, as indicated by the type of worksite, is also more permanent than in the other 
groups (52% of the survivors operate from the household, and 16% from another fixed 
location). Surprisingly, however, they are not more likely to have paid workers. In fact, the 
survivors have the highest proportion of firms with unpaid workers and the highest average 
number of unpaid workers. They are, however, the group in which the rates of participation in 
all institutions, except for indirect labour cost compliance, is highest (33% of these firms are 
registered with the national treasury, and 39% pay some tax). The average fraction of 
institutions in which firms participate is also highest. These findings imply that larger firms 
(in terms of net real revenue), with a higher expected lifetime or probability of survival, have 
higher degrees of participation.  
Exiting firms have the lowest average age (7 years), but not the lowest net real 
revenue, as one might expect. Their mode of operation is similar to that of new and re-
entrants: all groups have low proportions of firms operating from the household (around 
40%), and high proportions of mobile enterprises (47%) compared to the survivors. 
Surprisingly, exiting firms have the highest average number of paid workers and the lowest 
average number of unpaid workers. Their rates of participation are low and similar to both 
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groups of entrants. These characteristics support the predictions that exit rates are higher 
among both younger and more informal firms. 
Re-entering firms have the highest average age (12 years), but the lowest real net 
revenue (negative on average). They are most likely to be in the service sector, least likely to 
have any paid or unpaid workers, but the most likely to pay some indirect labour costs (11%) 
compared to the other groups23. The participation rates in the remaining institutions are low as 
is the case for new entrants. These characteristics are consistent with the prediction that small 
and inefficient firms are disproportionately informal.  
Finally, new entrants are the most likely to be mobile (47%) and have the lowest 
participation rates. Only 14% are registered, 17% pay some taxes, and less than 1% pay 
indirect labour costs. These findings are consistent with the prediction that young firms are 
disproportionately informal.  
Although the analysis is coarse, segmenting the micro-enterprises according to where 
they stand in their life cycle reinforces the importance of firm dynamics and life-cycle 
considerations for the analysis of participation. 
c. Participation in institutions 
As before, we test the predictions for the participation in individual institutions and fit 
a probit regression to equation (4). The results reported in table 9 confirm that without 
exceptions, the estimated coefficient on firm size is significantly positive. Age, however, only 
has a significantly positive effect on participation (excluding labour costs) in the regressions 
for all firms and new entrants. It is not surprising that the estimated coefficients of age in the 
re-entering and exiting groups are insignificant or negative after controlling for real revenue.  
Nonetheless, we would expect not only a positive but also significant estimated coefficient on 
age for the firms remaining in business. Testing for depth of participation (table 10), we 
obtain similar results. The analysis of the panel of micro-enterprises, therefore, generally 
lends support to the dynamic predictions of the framework.  
We also conducted several checks for robustness24 using both the unbalanced and 
balanced panel data. We tested the model using net (log) real monthly revenue25 instead of  
gross (log) real revenue, we dropped firms in business for more than 50 years, included a 
dummy variable for fixed site as an additional regressor, and ran separate cross-sectional 
regressions. Overall, the results were similar to the ones presented.    
                                                 
23 In comparison, only 3.4% of the survivors pay any indirect labour costs.  




Using panel data on micro-enterprises from Peru, we find evidence suggesting that 
firm dynamics explain ‘formality’ i.e. the decision to participate in societal institutions. 
Although the degree of participation is generally very low, the patterns of participation are 
heterogeneous across micro-enterprises, indicating that the traditional duality of formal versus 
informal sector firms obscures many aspects. Over time, participation (and depth of 
participation) is found to increase in firm size and age. That is, firms move from informality 
to formality as they grow to their long-run size. These dynamics are further illustrated by the 
relationship found between a firm’s life-cycle and its degree of participation. Firms entering 
business start off small and have the highest failure rates. As a result, new entrants display 
very low degrees of participation. As firms grow, they become more confident about their 
survival probabilities, switch to more permanent modes of operation and participate in an 
increasing number of institutions. However, not all firms grow over time. In fact, there is a 
considerable number of long-lived firms which remain small, both in terms of the workforce 
and revenues, and operate with interruptions. These firms exhibit very low degrees of 
participation.  
The results obtained from our panel data are comparable to those reported by 
Levenson and Maloney (1998) for micro-enterprises in Mexico. Although the Peruvian micro-
enterprises display consistently lower rates of participation, the patterns of participation 
across different firm characteristics are similar.  
Since De Soto’s (1989) critique of the “mercantilist” Peruvian State, many efforts 
have been made to reduce the costs of regulatory compliance for micro-enterprises. 
Nevertheless, the data show that the rates of participation are still low among micro-
enterprises. More importantly, the findings suggest that participation might not per se improve 
the viability and growth of micro-enterprises. In fact, our evidence suggests the importance of 
other factors, such as entrepreneurial ability and market opportunities, in determining the 
firm’s life-cycle and hence participation. 
  There are, however, some caveats. The framework does not embed the traditional 
approach of government enforcement or the relative costs and benefits of participation. In 
addition, the firm’s participation decision is not modelled explicitely, but derived from the 
implications of Jovanovic’s (1982) noisy learning model. We leave the latter for future 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 When testing with (log) real net revenues, we constructed two variables: one for firms with positive profits and 
another with negative profits.  
 16
reasearch. Finally, given the methodology applied in creating the balanced panel data and the 
different sub-groups, some care should be taken when interpreting the results from our 
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Unbalanced data: summary statistics of micro-enterprise sectors  
 
 
 All Sectors Production Resale Services 
Variable Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Real gross monthly revenue 1182.30 2725.70 5975 1012.78 2294.94 860 1400.18 3091.00 2620 1010.35 2427.56 2438 
(log) real gross monthly revenue 6.28 1.32 5735 5.96 1.48 804 6.53 1.22 2540 6.13 1.32 2336 
Real net revenue -213.82 25892.26 5695 140.55 4034.72 823 -297.44 27086.42 2540 -268.62 29195.75 2278 
Years in business 8.94 10.53 6387 11.69 11.24 919 7.73 9.85 2738 9.16 10.60 2667 
Number of paid workers 0.66 1.13 6398 0.87 1.41 921 0.58 0.97 2741 0.68 1.18 2673 
Any paid workers 0.41 0.49 6398 0.45 0.50 921 0.38 0.49 2741 0.42 0.49 2673 
Number of unpaid workers 1.22 0.91 4385 0.40 1.09 618 1.41 0.98 1853 0.98 0.69 1861 
Any unpaid workers 0.86 0.35 4385 0.87 0.34 618 0.89 0.31 1853 0.82 0.38 1861 
Registered national treasury 0.22 0.41 6395 0.22 0.41 921 0.26 0.44 2740 0.19 0.39 2671 
Paid any council tax 0.11 0.31 5696 0.07 0.26 823 0.16 0.37 2540 0.07 0.25 2279 
Paid any other tax  0.22 0.41 5696 0.19 0.39 823 0.29 0.46 2540 0.14 0.35 2279 
Paid any taxes 0.28 0.45 5696 0.22 0.41 823 0.38 0.49 2540 0.18 0.38 2279 
Paid indirect labour cost  0.04 0.20 2335 0.03 0.18 372 0.03 0.18 967 0.05 0.22 982 
Fraction of all institutions 0.15 0.23 5693 0.13 0.22 823 0.19 0.25 2539 0.11 0.21 2277 
Worksite in household 0.37 0.48 7124 0.65 0.48 921 0.43 0.50 2741 0.31 0.46 2673 
Other fixed worksite  0.13 0.34 7124 0.12 0.33 921 0.18 0.38 2741 0.12 0.32 2673 




Incidence of registration with national treasury and payment of taxes by various firm 
characteristics  
 
  All firms Firms with RUC 
  N %  % regis with RUC 
% pay 
taxes N %  % pay taxes 




27.65 1358 100.0 71.28 




34.13 727 100.0 72.21 






32.19 645 0.89 70.23 
2b. and indirect labour costs >0 95 3.7 
86.32 80.0 82 0.11 87.80 






31.30 972 100.0 71.60 






36.64 500 100.0 72.20 
4a. and indirect labour costs = 0 1364 86.43 32.36 34.31 441 88.2 69.61 
4b. and indirect labour costs >0 69 4.38 85.51 82.61 59 11.8 91.53 
* The numbers in brackets indicate that there are missing values for the variable whether firms pay taxes. For 





The relationship between formality and firm size and age  
 
 Registered with treasury Any taxes paid 
Compliance with indirect 
labour costs 
Real gross 
revenue decile Mean N Mean N Mean N 
1st decile 0.06 601 0.05 387 0.01 123 
2nd decile 0.03 597 0.06 567 0.00 187 
3rd decile 0.06 594 0.10 579 0.01 199 
4th decile 0.12 597 0.15 593 0.00 198 
5th decile 0.16 598 0.22 592 0.01 207 
6th decile 0.24 597 0.30 592 0.01 217 
7th decile 0.26 598 0.32 595 0.02 256 
8th decile 0.32 601 0.38 602 0.05 239 
9th decile 0.42 592 0.46 592 0.06 302 




 Registered with treasury Any taxes paid 
Compliance with indirect 
labour costs 
Years in 
business Mean N Mean N Mean N 
Less than 1 yr 0.12 662 0.16 569 0.01 226 
1 year 0.15 713 0.22 597 0.03 265 
2 years 0.19 629 0.25 567 0.03 230 
3 years 0.18 545 0.25 484 0.04 181 
4 years 0.23 399 0.29 352 0.04 159 
5 years 0.25 445 0.31 398 0.05 146 
6-7 years 0.25 428 0.33 375 0.03 118 
8-9 years 0.26 351 0.35 320 0.05 135 
10-12 years 0.27 620 0.30 566 0.05 246 
13-15 years 0.27 412 0.31 382 0.06 175 
16-19 years 0.33 209 0.33 193 0.04 85 
20-29 years 0.28 605 0.32 558 0.05 237 




Participation in societal institutions  
 
Variables Registered with treasury Pays any taxes Indirect labour costs 
 coefficient mg effect coefficient mg effect coefficient mg effect 
































N 5723  5635  2299  
Production       
(log) real 















N 802  798  365  

















N 2537  2519  948  
Services       
(log) real 















N 2329  2265  972  
The probit regressions include also a constant and year dummies. Standard errors are heteroscedasticity corrected 




Depth of participation in societal institutions  
 
Fraction of all institutions in 
which firm participates All Sectors Production Resale Services 














Production 0.6 (2.92)    
Resale 0.8 (4.03)    
Service 0.3 (3.28)    
N 5633 798 2519 2263 
Population-averaged panel estimation including also a constant and year dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity corrected and absolute values of z statistics are presented in parentheses. 
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Table 6  
Permanence of worksite 
 
All sectors coefficient marginal effect
(log) real 
 gross revenue 
0.31 
(13.58) 0.07 
Years in business 8E-3 (3.96) 2E-3 
Production -0.13 (0.70) -0.3 
Resale 0.22 (01.2) -5E-3 
Service -0.17 (0.93) -0.4 
N 5725  
The probit regressions also include a constant and year dummies. 
Standard errors are heteroscedasticity corrected and absolute values of z  





Balanced data: Proportions of firms entering, exiting or remaining in business 
 
 
 1992 - 94 1995 - 97 1998 - 2000 
Firm entries  108  (31.8%) 155  (45.6%) 153  (43.6%) 
  new entries (< 2 yrs) 
  re-entries (> 2 yrs) 
108  (31.8%) 
n.a. 
82  (24.1%) 
73  (21.5%) 
59  (16.8%) 
94  (26.8%) 
Survivors  232  (68.2%) 185  (54.4%) 198  (56.4%) 
Firm exits, which in 
previous period were n.a. - 155 - 142 

















Balanced data: summary statistics of micro-enterprise segments  
 Remained in Business Exiting Firms Re-entrants New entrants 
Variable Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N Mean S.D. N 
Real gross monthly revenue 1279.62 1889.94 590 885.69 1444.72 279 955.61 1959.68 151 792.29 1333.67 228 
(log) real gross monthly revenue 6.49 1.26 569 6.15 1.25 256 5.90 1.45 150 6.08 1.16 215 
Real net revenue 117.24 3648.05 571 79.02 1606.28 253 -8189.63 102417.3 148 66.87 2498.82 213 
Years in business 12.07 8.96 615 6.97 8.45 297 12.32 9.33 167 0.988 0.775 249 
Number of paid workers 0.753 1.14 615 0.795 0.970 297 0.228 0.869 167 0.687 0.962 249 
Any paid workers 0.467 0.499 615 0.562 0.497 297 0.120 0.326 167 0.486 0.501 249 
Number of unpaid workers 1.44 1.11 383 1.08 0.782 142 1.13 0.926 167 1.10 0.813 141 
Any unpaid workers 0.883 0.322 383 0.852 0.356 142 0.814 0.390 167 0.858 0.350 141 
Registered national treasury 0.332 0.471 615 0.145 0.352 297 0.150 0.358 167 0.137 0.344 249 
Paid any council tax 0.145 0.353 571 0.079 0.270 253 0.095 0.294 148 0.075 0.264 213 
Paid any other tax  0.327 0.470 571 0.158 0.366 253 0.115 0.320 148 0.127 0.333 213 
Paid any taxes 0.387 0.488 571 0.198 0.399 253 0.189 0.393 148 0.169 0.376 213 
Paid indirect labour cost  0.034 0.181 265 0.007 0.083 144 0.105 0.315 19 0.009 0.097 106 
Fraction of all institutions 0.210 0.255 571 0.100 0.185 253 0.100 0.181 148 0.090 0.184 213 
Worksite in household 0.522 0.500 615 0.401 0.491 297 0.425 0.496 167 0.410 0.493 249 
Other fixed worksite  0.161 0.368 615 0.138 0.346 297 0.114 0.318 167 0.116 0.321 249 




Balanced data: participation in societal institutions 
 
Variables Registered with federal treasury Pays any taxes Indirect labour costs 


















N 933  927  351  
Firms remaining in business 
(log) real 















N 569  568  261  
Exiting firms 
(log) real 















N 255  249  58  
Re-entrants 
(log) real 















N 149  147  13  
New entrants 
(log) real 















N 215  212  26  
The probit (cluster) regressions also include a constant, and both sector and year dummies. Standard errors are 




Balanced data: Depth of participation in societal institutions  
 
Fraction of all 
institutions in which 
firm participates 
All firms Firms remaining  Exiting firms Re-entrants 
New 
entrants 





















N 927 568 251 147 212 
OLS cluster estimation including also a constant and both sector and year dummies. Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity corrected and absolute values of z statistics are presented in parentheses. 
